




Considering armed violence in the post-conflict transition: 
DDR and small arms and light weapons reduction initiatives 







Jeremy Ginifer, with Mike Bourne and Owen Greene 
Department of Peace Studies 




















DDR and SALW Reduction Initiatives, Ginifer and Bourne, September 2004 
The Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative 
 
This report was prepared by the Centre for International Cooperation and Security 
based in Bradford University’s Department of Peace Studies. It is part of a wider 
project – the Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative (AVPI) – which is being funded 
by the UK government’s Department for International Development (DFID).  
 
The AVPI is made up of four projects: 
1) A Briefing Papers series on armed violence and poverty reduction measures in the 
areas of DDR (Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration), SSR (Security 
Sector Reform), Conflict Assessment, and Rural Livelihoods. 
2) An assessment of the impact of small arms projects on arms availability and 
poverty. 
3) A research project which documents and analyses the circumstances in and 
processes by which armed violence exacerbates poverty and development. 
4) A research project documenting the impact of arms transfers on poverty and 
development. 
 
All of these papers can be downloaded at www.bradford.ac.uk/cics.  
 
This initiative, which expanded beyond DFID to involve a number of donor agencies 
and NGOs, grew out of a concern to understand the problems created by arms 
availability and their violent use, and of the ways in which measures to reduce armed 
violence can be integrated into poverty reduction work at both policy and programme 
level. This briefing aims to highlight and clarify the importance of the availability and 
misuse of small arms and light weapons (SALW), and associated armed violence, for 
development programming in the area of Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration (DDR). The author would like to thank Robert Muggah for comments 
made on an earlier draft. 
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1. Introduction  
 
This briefing paper seeks to increase awareness of and review the linkages between 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and small arms and light 
weapons (SALW) reduction in the context of post-conflict reconstruction (PCR). It is 
targeted at those working on poverty reduction at both the policy and programme 
level, particularly those with comparatively modest engagement in these areas. Its 
objective is to outline the types of activities that have been undertaken under these 
rubrics, the difficulties and constraints encountered at the level of implementation, 
and, in particular, to identify opportunities in linking SALW programmes and DDR. It 
also seeks to highlight the problems created by widespread arms availability and 
usage in PCR. This briefing paper is not intended as a comprehensive review of the 
state of DDR/SALW/PCR programming and policy, but rather an introduction to 
some of the core issues. 
 
DDR assistance is now a relatively well-established area of programming for DFID 
and many other development aid agencies (see box 1 below for a description of DDR 
and SALW processes), as is PCR. However, they are often inadequately linked with 
SALW programmes, to mutual disadvantage. For the purposes of this paper, a 
distinction is drawn between DDR and SALW programming. Operationally, this has 
tended to be the case with SALW initiatives often being a distinct follow-up activity 
to DDR. However, it is recognised that of late some SALW programming is tending  
to merge or connect more with DDR and with PCR. This briefing thus aims to 
highlight ways in which efforts to address SALW and the armed violence associated 
with them in post-conflict countries can contribute to the effectiveness of DDR and 
PCR programming, and vice versa.  
 
Many of the problems associated with the post-conflict period arise from the 
continuing activities of armed groups and misuse of weapons. Countries emerging 
from war are particularly at risk from the re-emergence of armed conflict, and also 
from widespread violence and intimidation. Excessively available arms, particularly 
SALW, are often an important factor in the escalation, intensity, spread and duration 
of conflict and violent criminality, which obstructs and undermines peace-building 
and humanitarian and development aid. The poor are generally especially vulnerable 
due to their exposure to armed violence and to declining quality and access to 
services.  
 
Although DDR programmes aim to disarm and integrate ex-combatants, they are 
seldom integrated with initiatives to collect and control arms amongst other sectors of 
society, or with longer-term programmes to provide a safe and secure environment for 
development to proceed. SALW programmes can help to address some of the 
shortfalls experienced with DDR programmes and can provide useful complementary 
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Box 1: What are DDR/SALW programmes? 
 
DDR typically refers to the process of collecting arms, particularly SALW, from 
combatants after peace agreements or cessations of civil wars and returning 
combatants to civilian life. The term ‘DDR’ is used here but other terms such as 
‘DDRR’ (disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and reconciliation) and ‘D3’ 
have been used to describe similar process dealing with post-conflict weapons usage 
and possession. The principal objectives of DDR programmes are to prevent the 
resumption of armed conflict and help create the conditions for post-conflict 
reconstruction and peace-building. The first disarmament stage has involved amassing 
combatants in assembly or cantonment areas, collecting their weapons for destruction, 
storage, or re-allocation, identifying and registering them, and assessing some of their 
basic needs and requirements. The process of demobilisation builds on this by 
preparing combatants for entry into a new and reformed national army under civilian 
control or by returning them to civilian life. This process is frequently facilitated with 
transitional allowances to tide ex-combatants over until they find a peaceful 
livelihood. The third phase – reintegration – is designed to provide assistance in the 
form of, for example, training, allowances, tools and implements, so that ex-
combatants can be productive and rehabilitated members of society that no longer 
pose a threat. 
 
SALW programmes include a wide range of measures to control and reduce 
availability and flows of SALW, not only in post-conflict countries but also in other 
states experiencing problems of armed violence, insecurity, or illicit trafficking. Types 
of SALW programmes have included: voluntary weapons collection programmes 
from civilians; public arms destruction events; development and implementation of 
regulations to control SALW possession, trade and use; measures to support and 
improve enforcement of such regulations; public awareness and education; measures 
to prevent, combat and reduce illicit trafficking of SALW; sub-regional co-operation, 
for example in border controls; and efforts to improve the management and security of 
authorised SALW holdings by the police, army and civilians. In post-conflict 
contexts, SALW programmes have tended to take place separately to DDR processes. 
Sometimes, they have addressed gaps in DDR processes and have tended to be 
sequenced towards the end or after DDR. Weapons for development programmes, for 
example, have sought to persuade arms holders – often civilians or armed groups who 
were outside the formal DDR process – to give up weapons for specific (collectively-
determined) incentives such as integration into community work schemes. This 
programming has tended to be more driven by developmental, community peace-
building objectives, and individual incentives than DDR which, at least in its initial 
phases, has been predominantly overseen by the military. 
 
 
2. What problems have DDR programmes experienced, and what risks 
do they entail for PCR and development? 
 
Persuading combatants, and also civilians, to give up their arms is often difficult, not 
least because weapons possession can often be valued for social, economic, and 
security purposes in post-conflict contexts. Further, it may not always be appropriate 
to disarm in environments where collecting SALW can actually strengthen the hand 
of spoilers, create asymmetries and even heighten insecurity. The challenges of 
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disarming, even where appropriate, have often been made worse by inadequately 
designed and implemented DDR initiatives. Key areas where DDR has sometimes 
been ineffective include: 
 
2.1 Arms collection 
Disarmament and arms collection programmes, although sometimes successful in 
collecting a considerable number of weapons, have often failed to collect all the 
weapons specifically scheduled for collection under DDR agreements.  Some 
weapons remain hidden in arms caches as an insurance against failed DDR 
programmes or for use in criminal activities. DDR initiatives have sometimes turned a 
blind eye to the problem of caches prioritising the maintenance of a ceasefire over 
comprehensive disarmament. Another problem has been the drift of individual ex-
combatants back to communities, still retaining weaponry, as occurred in Somaliland, 
rather than a structured demobilisation.  
 
2.2 Weapons buy-backs 
Schemes to collect illicit weapons from ex-combatants by offering cash incentives 
have sometimes run into difficulties as they have inflated prices for weapons and 
created parallel markets where weapons have proliferated rather than been reduced. 
They have also created resentment among civilians who have interpreted cash 
incentives as rewarding combatants who they often regard as responsible for the 
conflict. 
 
2.3 Armed groups/civilian weapons holdings  
Key groups have fallen outside disarmament mandates such as militia, criminal 
groups, and armed civilians as they have not always been a party to the peace 
agreements that have articulated DDR initiatives. These pose considerable problems 
in the PCR phase, particularly in terms of banditry and violent criminality. DDR 
programmes are seldom complemented by interventions, much less regulatory 
mechanisms, to collect and control civilian weapons, which have tended to be hidden 
in homes and communities rather than contained in arms caches. 
 
2.4 Registration failures 
Significant numbers of ex-combatants fail to register in DDR initiatives. These 
unregistered ex-combatants pose significant risks for PCR as they are likely to feel 
resentful and may engage in violence or become socially disruptive. DDR 
programming has often been powerless to provide adequate incentives to engage them 
in meaningful disarmament. At the same time, there has been the problem of non-
entitled combatants and civilians trying to infiltrate DDR initiatives to claim benefits. 
Women and child soldiers, particularly in the early days, were sometimes 
inadequately integrated into reintegration initiatives, or as is still sometimes the case, 
their special needs have been inadequately catered for. There remains a continuing 
problem in DDR initiatives as to whether combatants’ dependents should receive 
reintegration support. 
 
2.5 Stockpile management  
When SALW have been collected during DDR programmes they have frequently not 
been stored in secure and safe facilities. As a result, collected arms have often been 
reclaimed, stolen or recycled into criminal networks and militias.   
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2.6 Regional arms flows 
DDR programmes have failed to institutionalise comprehensive measures to prevent 
re-arming through regional arms flows, such as substantive border checks and 
customs. Nor have they tended to be linked into regional arms control measures and 
agreements. 
 
2.7 Incomplete reintegration 
Although reliable statistics are generally scarce, criminality has often appeared to 
increase in the aftermath of DDR as ostensibly “reintegrated” ex-combatants released 
into communities have failed to find livelihoods and employment – sometimes due to 
poorly constructed reintegration programmes. Reintegration programmes have often 
failed to meet the needs of ex-combatants with poor targeting, for example, in terms 
of training for viable livelihoods and employment. Further, many ex-combatants have 
adopted unrealistic assumptions regarding their future employment prospects and 
have been reluctant to consider training that might give them feasible options of 
making a sustainable living. A tendency not to fully engage communities in the 
reintegration process has also been apparent in some DDR initiatives.  However, more 
recent DDR operations, as in Sudan, have sought to identify local and regional 
implementing structures, strategies and mechanisms to ensure the representation and 
inclusion of communities (including youths, women, elders and combatants) in DDR 
dialogues, design and implementation. 
 
2.8 Difficulties in re-constituting national armies 
There are inherent political and economic difficulties associated with the 
determination and planning of the appropriate size and composition of national 
armies. In the post-conflict period, re-constituted national armies have only usually 
absorbed small numbers of ex-combatants and large numbers of them have been 
released into society with few prospects of employment, although in some other cases 
excess numbers of combatants have been fed into national armies creating a separate 
set of problems. 
 
2.9 Returns to conflict 
DDR initiatives have not necessarily enhanced peace-building. In countries such as 
Angola or Congo-Brazzavile, where disarmament was pursued with a lack of rigor at 
certain stages, the parties returned to armed conflict. Further, many parties in 
disarmament initiatives have included ‘spoilers’ with little or no commitment to 
giving up arms. 
 
2.10 Balancing security and development priorities 
The development component of DDR (reintegration) has tended to be relatively short-
term and under-resourced. There tends to be a disjunction between the ‘security’ 
phase of DDR (disarmament/demobilisation) implemented primarily by the military 
and well-funded, and the reintegration phase funded from voluntary contributions and 
implemented by international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and 
development agencies with considerably less resources. Moreover, some major 
development agencies are unable to fund “disarmament” – leading to difficulties in 
appropriately sequencing the process. Consequently, reintegration efforts have often 
yielded inconclusive outcomes.  
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2.11 Lack of connection with the police  
DDR programmes have frequently failed to connect sufficiently with the police and 
the justice sector to mitigate the problems of increasing crime levels that often follow 
the demobilisation of ex-combatants. There have also been problems in terms of 
absorbing ex-combatants into the police, as in the Solomon Islands or Haiti, as ex-
combatants do not necessarily make suitable police officers. 
 
2.12 Vulnerable groups 
The needs of vulnerable ex-combatant groups, such as disabled veterans, and child 
and women soldiers, have frequently been insufficiently addressed in DDR 
programmes. As a consequence, in the PCR phase their specific needs and concerns 
go unanswered. 
 
2.13 Reconciliation issues 
DDR programmes have tended to achieve only partial success in assisting in 
reconciling ex-combatants with communities to which they are returning. 
Reconciliation remains inherently problematic when ex-combatants have committed 
atrocities in their own communities and are seen as ‘part of the problem’ by many 
civilians. Further, ‘segregated settlement’ of ex-combatants in communities has 
sometimes hampered reconciliation. However, reconciliation has not necessarily been 
seen as a DDR programme priority. 
 
 
3. Could links with SALW programmes help address some of 
these shortfalls? 
 
Though an integrated array of measures are required to address the above-mentioned 
problems, SALW programmes can be helpful in several key areas. SALW 
programmes can address gaps in DDR programming. They can particularly contribute 
in relation to efforts to: develop and strengthen national and regional arms collection 
and control initiatives targeted at weapons holders that have not been disarmed or 
reintegrated under DDR. These can also help to strengthen links between immediate 
post-conflict disarmament efforts and longer-term weapons reduction and control as 
part of peace and community-building and development efforts. SALW and related 
programming can potentially make contributions in a number of areas discussed 
below. 
 
3.1 Follow-up on DDR arms collection shortfalls  
SALW programmes can be phased to cover arms collection shortfalls during and after 
DDR initiatives. In particular, they have the capacity to target armed groups and 
individuals that tend to fall outside the DDR process. They can also engage with ex-
combatants who have failed to register in formal DDR processes. In this sense, SALW 
programmes usefully complement, as well as offering follow up, to DDR. Armed 
groups and civilians also often require different approaches to that of ex-combatants 
who are frequently under centralised control and are more likely to give up arms if 
ordered to do so by leaderships.  Armed groups, such as militia and civil defence 
forces, may require a more incentive-based, and participatory, voluntary weapons 
collection approach.  
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Weapons for development programmes have the capacity to link arms collection with 
longer-term and sustainable community development objectives that are not fully 
prioritised in DDR programmes. These, for example, have offered community-based 
development or community-building programmes (such as building of water wells, 
schools, health centres or community centres) in association with the voluntary hand-
in of weapons by civilians. Weapons for development programmes may also include 
ex-combatants who, for various reasons, have not registered in formal DDR-based 
disarmament or who have returned to civilian communities. In Sierra Leone, for 
example, combatants who opted out of reintegration benefits to fight in other conflicts 
in West Africa may have to go through weapons for development programmes as the 
Government of Sierra Leone has made it clear that they will receive no reintegration 
benefits as they have ‘missed the boat’ by not registering in formal DDR initiatives 
which have now concluded. The UNDP Arms for Development Programme 
(CACDII) in Sierra Leone has sought to follow-on from DDR programmes to reduce 
feelings of insecurity and strengthen community development through further 
weapons collection and establishment of weapons-free communities. Participating 
chiefdoms are provided with US $20,000 and expertise to use on projects identified 
through community discussion and agreement.   
 
Box 2: Post-conflict community reintegration in Sierra Leone 
 
A good example of a programme that has addressed shortfalls in DDR programming 
is the Community Reintegration Programme (CRP) supported by DFID in Sierra 
Leone. As part of this programme, a number of ex-combatants are working with local 
communities in joint agricultural initiatives and also taking part in joint skills training.  
During the formal DDR programme in Sierra Leone that ended in January 2002, a 
number of ex-combatants had still to reintegrate into communities despite transitional 
allowances. Along with GTZ’s React Programme, which adopted a community 
reintegration approach, the CRP has made significant strides in averting ex-
combatants contemplating re-arming or becoming engaged in criminality. 
 
 
Weapons-for-livelihoods programmes can be further useful entry points in 
demilitarising communities and creating livelihoods for groups who have legitimate 
reasons for weapons possession. For example, hunters have used their weapons in 
conflict as well as for livelihood purposes. Following conflict, they may still require 
their weapons for livelihood purposes but their continued possession of weapons 
poses a potential threat to communities. Retraining in, for example, fishing skills, and 
the provision of nets and equipment in exchange for their weapons can provide an 
incentive for the handing in of weapons. Pastoralists who require guns for curbing 
predators of livestock may need to be offered similar schemes. In the immediate post-
conflict environment, DDR has not tended to prioritise these activities, as persuading 
the warring parties to stop fighting has been the immediate priority rather than dealing 
with armed groups. 
 
3.2 Stockpile management 
SALW programmes can complement efforts to improve DDR stockpile management 
by strengthening security over authorised stocks of arms country-wide, as well as by 
introducing rigorous procedures and management of stockpiles, and also proper 
weapons destruction procedures when required. 
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3.3 Confidence-building including weapons-free zones  
SALW programmes can be phased to address confidence-building shortfalls and 
insecurity during DDR initiatives. A key weakness of DDR has sometimes been its 
inability to bear down on weapons possession and display across society, thus creating 
incentives to retain and use arms. SALW programmes (as in the gun-free-zones 
established in South Africa and the Solomon Islands) can build confidence by creating 
weapons-free zones in communities and issuing certificates to confirm this. Even if 
some weapons are secretly retained, they are hidden and become less available. This 
not only creates local confidence it can also serve as an entry point for wider donor 
engagement by creating a more secure environment within which PCR can take place. 
 
Box 3: Arms caches, the police and regional  
cooperation: Mozambique 
 
A key difficulty in the DDR process undertaken in Mozambique (1992-94), was that 
the government and the rebel RENAMO movement, as well as individual combatants, 
secretly established arms caches outside the disarmament process. Arms caches in 
Mozambique (as well as Swaziland and Zimbabwe) have fuelled crime, regional arms 
trafficking and armed criminality in South Africa’s cities.  However, regional co-
operation, particularly through South African technical assistance and cooperation 
with the Mozambican police, and SADC, has contributed to the uncovering of caches 
and the destruction of weapons that would otherwise have fuelled crime in the region. 
In the latest phase of Operation Rachel the information on arms caches was collected 
by the Mozambican police. Building the capacity of the police and regional 
cooperation is essential both to tackling specific problems of arms caches and to 
broader PCR and governance goals.   
 
 
3.4 Engaging the police in arms collection and community security 
The police can make a major contribution to dealing with DDR civilian weapons 
shortfalls. Retraining the police in community policing is frequently undertaken as 
part of security-sector reform (SSR) in PCR. The thorny issue of civilian 
disarmament, which has usually been bypassed in DDR programmes, can be 
implemented and monitored by the police rather than the military as part of SALW 
programmes. Further, SALW programmes can provide an important entry point for 
police re-training and improved police-community relations.  
 
3.5 Addressing regional arms flows 
SALW programming can help to address the problem of regional arms flows 
undermining disarmament undertaken during DDR initiatives. Measures including 
training and strengthening customs, border police, and cross border commissions, 
have been important elements of SALW programming, as well as building up 
supporting infrastructure.          
 
3.6 Sensitisation and social mobilisation against SALW possession 
SALW programming can add to the effectiveness of DDR by seeking to change 
attitudes to SALW possession, which often remains largely unaffected by DDR 
programmes that have tended to target immediate weapons collection priorities rather 
than attitudes. This type of programming should ideally be phased in at an early stage 
of DDR.  One approach that can be drawn upon is sensitisation and social 
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mobilisation against SALW possession. This has been done through educational 
programmes, the use of theatre, dance, the media, and other mediums. Special groups, 
particularly the young, who have been left out of DDR programming may be 
persuaded to forgo the perceived attractions of guns and criminal activity through 
education and training. 
 
3.7 Conflict prevention/dispute mechanisms to facilitate  
weapons reduction 
Establishing local conflict prevention and dispute mechanisms is a SALW programme 
technique that may be particularly useful to facilitate weapons handovers in areas 
where arms are, in part, a means of protecting livelihoods, such as in Northern Kenya 
or the Southern Highlands of Papua New Guinea. In Kenya, for example, peace and 
development committees have had a role to play in this area. Further, SALW 
programmes are in a better position to address reconciliation issues than DDR 
programmes which tend to cut off at the point of short-term reintegration of ex-
combatants into communities. 
 
3.8 Vulnerable groups  
SALW programmes can play an important role in efforts to address the long-term 
needs of groups such as child soldiers and women combatants who may have special 
needs in terms of DDR. Women combatants will need to be safeguarded against rape 
in demobilisation centres, for example, and they may face particular problems in 
seeking to reintegrate. DDR processes tend to kick-start the reintegration of child 
soldiers, for example, with short-term programming that may only last a year or so, 
but which require further follow-up if they are to be sustainable.   
 
 
4. How can SALW and DDR programming be better phased 
and integrated? 
 
DDR and SALW programmes have tended to be phased separately. DDR programmes 
have usually been set up as part of ceasefire arrangements involving the parties to the 
conflict and external bodies, such as the UN, who are engaged in PCR. As a 
consequence, they have often been informed by relatively short-term security and 
political considerations, in particular preventing further fighting between warring 
parties. SALW programmes have tended to be follow-up initiatives that often address 
areas which DDR has failed to take on or have not fully followed through. DDR 
programmes themselves have had phasing difficulties with the components of DDR 
being sometimes insufficiently connected. Recently, there has been a greater 
awareness of the need to coordinate and link SALW and DDR. However, the 
opportunities have still not being fully realised. This might be realised in 
organisational terms by measures such as:  
 
? Joint planning and coordination mechanisms between SALW and DDR 
programming. 
? The early integration of SALW programming into DDR initiatives. For example, 
civilian arms collection programmes could be written into DDR mandates. 
? Training for those working on SALW and DDR to improve their understandings 
of the two types of programming. 
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? More research into the connections between DDR and SALW and how they can 
be integrated. 
? Factoring SALW/DDR issues into conflict assessments prior to the initiation of 
programming. 
? Engaging a wider audience of donors, INGOs, non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), and national governments in SALW and DDR issues. 
 
Above all, both DDR and SALW programmes need to be continually coordinated 
with other aspects of PCR, and the links between them used to facilitate effective 
transitions to longer-term peace-building and development efforts. Links with SSR are 
particularly important as a reformed police force, for example, can play an extremely 
important role in consolidating civilian disarmament and a reformed national army 




To fully realise the operational opportunities inherent in linking DDR and SALW 
programming an increased emphasis on the following might be considered in policy 
and programming terms.  
 
? A greater emphasis should be placed on sensitisation and community mobilisation 
against SALW possession. This should be undertaken early in DDR initiatives. 
Such measures have the capacity to avert subsequent post-conflict criminality and 
violence. 
 
? Civilian weapons collection should be written into DDR agreements, rather than 
be viewed as a post-DDR activity.  
 
? Community engagement and consultation should be a feature of DDR and SALW 
planning. This should include consultation in the design and implementation of 
DDR in particular which has frequently addressed perceived combatant needs 
rather than those of the whole community. 
 
? Confidence-building should be prioritised in DDR and SALW programming in the 
PCR phase. Poor weapons collection often leads to a highly insecure PCR 
environment. Confidence-building needs to be reinforced at the community level 
by measures such as weapons-free-zones/communities which have the capacity to 
create space for development to take place. The police also need to be involved in 
maintaining low levels of SALW once peacekeepers leave and the formal DDR 
process is over.  
 
? DDR and SALW should be linked into longer-term national gun legislation both 
nationally and regionally. 
 
? The reintegration element of DDR should be placed on a similar footing to 
disarmament and demobilisation in terms of funding. Further, it should be 
designed to be more long-term and sustainable.   
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If you wish to consult further about the relevance of SALW-related programmes to 
development strategies with which you are concerned, contact the SALW team at 
CHAD: 
 
Richard Haviland, SALW Programme Manager 
R-Haviland@dfid.gov.uk
Tel: +0044 (0)20 7023 0868 
 
Kate Joseph, Senior Non-Proliferation Consultant  
K-Joseph@dfid.gov.uk
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